Matt Tai’s recent live stream for Racket delved into the intricate and contentious issue surrounding the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) and its relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus was on how the EIP, a collaboration among various institutions, including Stanford’s Internet Observatory and the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public, was essentially a conduit for government censorship of political speech.
Tai began by highlighting a report from Jim Jordan’s House Weaponization of Government Subcommittee. The report, titled “Weaponization of Disinformation: Pseudo Experts and Bureaucrats,” scrutinizes how the federal government allegedly partnered with universities to censor Americans’ political speech. Tai and Michael Shellenberger had previously testified before this committee, asserting that the EIP functioned as a public-private censorship effort.
The EIP, according to Tai, was a cross-platform content moderation initiative targeting election-related speech. This involved de-amplifying or removing content and deactivating accounts based on recommendations from the EIP. Platforms affected included Twitter, Facebook, and others. Tai pointed out that the EIP was formed to fill a gap that DHS couldn’t legally or financially address. Alex Stamos, head of Stanford’s Internet Observatory, admitted on YouTube that the EIP was created because DHS lacked the funding and legal authority to tackle disinformation directly.
Despite this, there was significant pushback against the notion that the EIP was a censorship tool. The University of Washington, one of the EIP’s partners, denied that DHS had any control over the EIP. However, Tai argued that these denials were misleading. He cited evidence from Jordan’s report, including emails from the Atlantic Council and internal diagrams, which indicated that DHS was deeply involved in the EIP’s operations.
Tai emphasised that DHS’s involvement was not just theoretical but practical. He presented emails from Twitter’s top lawyers and other internal communications that showed DHS wanted to establish a centralized portal for reporting disinformation. This portal was to be managed by the Center for Internet Security (CIS), which is almost entirely funded by DHS. Tai explained that this convoluted structure was designed to obscure DHS’s direct involvement.
One of the most damning pieces of evidence Tai discussed was an email that revealed DHS could not openly endorse the portal but wanted to receive reports simultaneously with social media platforms. This arrangement allowed DHS to be intimately involved in the administration of the program without being publicly visible. Tai argued that this setup directly contradicted the denials from the EIP and its partners.
Tai also criticised the media’s portrayal of the EIP and its researchers. He showed headlines from the New York Times and the Washington Post that framed the issue as a partisan attack on academics studying disinformation. These articles failed to mention the EIP’s role in content removal and censorship, instead portraying the researchers as victims of right-wing harassment.
In conclusion, Tai asserted that the evidence clearly showed the EIP was a DHS operation designed to circumvent legal restrictions on government censorship. He called for greater transparency and accountability, arguing that the public has a right to know how their speech is being regulated. Tai’s investigation underscores the importance of scrutinising the relationships between government agencies and private institutions, especially when it comes to issues of free speech and censorship.